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1. Introduction
Talking of social prestige, we must consider the fact that, actually, there are 
two different types of social prestige. Both types are being discussed in the 
vast amount of literature on prestige -- but never conjunctively, and nowhere 
has the attempt been made towards an integration of the two concepts within a 
common theoretical exposition. Rarely in fact, the distinction has been noticed 
at all. Thus there is one and the same word being used to signify different sub­
stance, and it is this conceptual confusion that might well be responsible for 
the heterogeneity and incoherence of the prestige theories that have been pro­
posed to date.
What the two types of prestige refer to may become evident by analogy to a basic 
distinction in the theory of time. In an essay titled The unreality of time in 
1908, the British philosopher J.E. McTaggart observed that the concept of time 
is a two-facetted concept. When referring to incidents with regard to their 
"timelyness" we have the choice of two modes of expression: One is that mode by 
which we may indicate that an event X is either "earlier than" or "later than" 
an event Y, or that both events are occuring at the same point in time. This 
is what McTaggart calls the reference to the B-type series of time. There is 
also an A-series. This type of time is being made expression of when we say of 
an event that it is either a past, a presently occuring, or a future event.
It is obvious that both notions are distinct though both relate to the phenomenon 
of time; especially, the two modes of expression differ with respect to their 
relational attributes. In terms of the B-series of time, relations are absolute 
and unique since an event X occuring earlier than Y, say, is earlier than Y 
once and for all, regardless of whether X and Y are future or past occurrances 
or whether either X or Y is occuring presently. In contrast, the A-series of 
time establishes relative relations. Events being future events will become 
events happening now, and these will become events of the past and even the re­
mote past, eventually. However, whether they are being referred to as future, 
present, or past events is contingent on the observers location in time. Thus, 
in A-type terms, we may even speak of events with a passed future, i.e., events 
being future events for passed observers but passed events for present and fu­
ture observers.
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Keeping the absolute and the relative characteristics of time apart, has proved 
to be the touchstone for progress in modern theory of time. I like to suggest 
that a formally identical distinction should also be applied to the concept of 
prestige. As with time, there are two distinguishable modes of referring to 
prestige phenomena; one establishes absolute and the other relative order re­
lations.
With regard to a total society, what is commonly called a prestige order of that 
society has relational properties paralleling those McTaggart attributed to the 
B-series of time. When seeking a metric for a general prestige scale we are 
thinking in terms of “X is greater (has more prestige) than Y" and this order 
relation is ment to place all members of a society on the scale that is common 
to all. Just like the relations "later than" and "earlier than" establish an 
unique order of time, the relation "is more prestigeous than" establishes an 
unique order of prestige. This order is absolute in as much it is independent 
of any viewpoint or social position an observer may have. Therefore, the attempt 
to provide a prestige scale for a society as a total society is the attempt to 
design a structural dimension for that society. It is suggestive to label this 
type of prestige the B-series of prestige, relating it to McTaggart's distinction 
in the time domain.
The second type of social prestige is relative to the person experiencing and 
perceiving prestige. From this perspective, prestige is viewed from within a 
society, not from the detached platform the sociologist is supposed to stand on. 
It is the prestige attributed to social positions by incumbents of other social 
positions. Thus, this kind of social prestige is relative to the person making 
the prestige judgment, and it is relative to his or her location in society.
The prestige of this type expresses subjective order. Descriptors of time may
have a relative nature as well, making it depent on the observer's location in 
time whether events are past, present or future events. Since observers of 
prestige, in parallel, are themselves situated somewhere along the prestige 
continuum also, their judgments about this continuum are necessarily relative. 
What is a "higher" prestige to one judge will be a "lower" prestige to another, 
and the attributions of prestige both judges are making will differ due to this 
difference in perception. With reference to McTaggart's distinction, it will 
be convenient to call this type of prestige, or subjective order, the A-series 
of prestige, keeping it well separated from the structural B-series.
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I am introducing the distinction of two types of prestige because of the con­
sequences it has for the strategies of assessment and analysis of social prestige. 
Clearly, the order a total society has because it is structured according to 
the B-series of prestige must be assessed differently than that order that is 
inherently relative mirroring the perceptions of individuals or groups of indi­
viduals of the prestige order. With regard to the latter, the A-series of pre­
stige, methods for measuring prestige obviously must highlight interindividual 
differences whereas measurement of the B-series should disregard variation, if 
possible.
Before considering the consequences for empirical research, however, an answer 
to the question must be sought of how the results of this empirical research are 
to be interpreted. Instead with one, we are now dealing with two forms of social 
prestige. Is one more basic than the other? Which of the two types of prestige 
is that one which sociologists should turn to?
2. The unreality of prestige
It will be useful to observe how the theory of time is coping with this problem.
If McTaggart's distinction is accepted, time, like prestige, suffers a dupli­
cation of content, and the question is promptly raised which of both represents 
the reality of time. McTaggart's answer, which has stirred the debate ever since, 
is that time does not have reality at all, precisely because of its duplicate 
nature.
In a nutshell, McTaggart's contention is this: The B-series of time taken alone,
i.e., the weak order of elements according to the relations of "earlier than" 
and "later than", is not of specific temporal character. This is so because the 
B-series does not allow for change, and ... "it would, I suppose, be universally 
admitted that time involves change ...; there could be no time if nothing changed" 
(§309). Therefore, aiming at change we are left with the A-series and its relative 
determination of past-, presence-, and futureness. "If there is no real A-series, 
there is no real change" (§311). Thus, if the B-series is to be of specific tem­
poral character it must be interpreted in the light of the A-series permitting 
change.
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But what exactly is changing with regard to the A-series? Clearly, it is the 
A-series itself that suffers change: future changes to presence, presence to 
past- Therefore, if change is the necessary condition for the existence of time 
the A-series is not only the necessary condition for the B-series, in order for 
that series to be a series of time but, in addition, the A-series is the neces­
sary condition for its own existence. This amounts to a regressive assumption, 
and McTaggart's conclusion is that time is an unreal entity because this is so.
Turning to the concept of prestige, I believe that the same line of argument 
must be followed. Formally, both time and prestige are being faced with the same 
kind of problem calling for the same kind of solution. First, it is apparent 
that the B-series of prestige, like that of time, provides nothing but a weak 
order of elements which, in isolation, is of no specific prestigeous character.
It is simply order based on binary relations and it is defined on a set of ele­
ments referred to as "social positions11. These positions are ordered because 
they are associated with greater or smaller amounts of some quantity -- status, 
money, influence or power, for instance, -- or prestige. The B-series as such 
does not reveal on which of these ordered properties it is based. Second, paral­
leling time, the B-type prestige must be interpreted in the light of the A-type 
of prestige if the former is to become a series of prestige (and not of status, 
money possession and what not). Put differently, we are conceiving the B-series 
in terms of everyday experiences we are making when attributing levels of pre­
stige to incumbents of social positions, subjectively. Thus, the A-series of 
prestige is a necessary condition for the B-series to exist as an order of pre­
stige.
The analogies between time and prestige extent even further, however. Recall that 
change is the necessary supposition for the emergence of time. McTaggart argues 
that since the A-series is identical with change -- because future is changing 
to presence, presence to past -- we are trapped with the A-series for which, in 
order to exist, we must presuppose its existence already as such. It is inviting 
to analyze the emergence of prestige in the same vain. For that purpose, simply 
replace "subjective order" for "change". Clearly, the notion of prestige involves 
subjective order. However, as the B-series does not convey the prestigeous quali­
ty as such we must turn to the A-series in order to locate that quality. But due 
to its relativity and perspective ladden character the A-series is itself sub­
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jective order. Hence, if subjective order is the necessary condition for the 
existence of prestige the A-series is the necessary condition for both the 
B-series —  in order to be a series of prestige —  and for the existence of the 
A-series itself. As with time, therefore we are faced with a regressive sup­
position, and paralleling the conclusion drawn within the realm of time we must 
content ourselves with the idea that prestige is an entity lacking reality.
In view of this argument, it would be in vain to search for an empirical foun­
dation of prestige in terms of observables. Rather, we should conceive prestige 
as that mode by which subjective order of social positions is being given, con­
gruent to the way in which time is that mode by which change is given. Both modes 
are inexorable if we engage in subjective social orderings or exhibit change, 
respectively; but we should be cautioned if looking for empirical facts and 
matters that are the substance of either prestige or time. Phrasing it as White­
head would, we should say that both concepts are victims of fallacies of mis­
placed concreteness if we insist that they are to span their specific A-series 
as well as their B-series, simultaneously.
3. Status order and the relative order of "life styles'*
Accepting this conjecture, what is there left for sociologists to do who are 
convinced that prestige is an empirically relevant concept? First of all, I 
think, they should quitt calling that which they are searching for "prestige". 
Prestige is a label that is blurring the distinction between its two component 
parts, at least there is ample evidence of this confounding in the writings on 
the subject matter.
Basically, what common empirical studies of prestige are about is this: Respon­
dents to a survey are being asked either to rank or to rate a series of labels 
representing social positions, occupations for the most part or vignettes of 
family compositions, for instance. The criteria of judgments the respondents are 
to apply are usually phrased in terms of the "social standing" or simply "pre­
stige" that is associated with the stimuli. Following that, the individual 
numerical judgments are handled by various aggregation schemes, simple arithmetic 
means being the most common. Sometimes, however, the individual judgments are 
given weights, prior to aggregation, in order to ensure the resulting scale to
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extent from zero to 100, say. This is what, for instance, North and Hatt have 
done in their 1947 NORC study that has shaped much of the research in this area. 
Others have turned to different methods of transformation and aggregation, 
Treiman's (1977) attempt to gain a common occupational prestige scale from 
studies in 55 different countries perhaps employing the most capricious methods 
of all.
Considering these habits of scale construction, we should be attentive to the 
fact that in the process of this construction the two types of prestige we have 
come to distinguish are being exchanged at free will. The basis of inquiry in 
prestige studies are judgments individuals make about their perception of the 
distribution of prestige and clearly, what they refer to in their judgments is 
the A-type series of prestige. Asking people to order social positions will, 
at best, result in knowledge about the relative and subjective orderings of 
which individual respondents are capable. This assessment is directed toward 
the A-series of prestige since it is contingent on the location each individual 
has within the society the judgments pertain to. There need not be consensus, 
unless demonstrated.
In contrast, aggregating the individual judgments over an entire population of 
judges amounts to neglecting the individual particularities these judges were 
aiming to express. Thus conceptually, the aggregation values represent a diffe­
rent order than that of the individual respondents. Disregarding interindividual 
variation, we are leaving the A-series of prestige replacing it by the B-series. 
The B-series, however, stripped of its subject-based perspectives represents 
simply order with regard to the social positions of a society. The claim of 
calling it the prestige order of that society is without justification whatso­
ever. The original judgments of prestige -- which are tight to the particular 
Lebenswelt of the individual —  have undergone intensive manipulations in the 
process of aggregation. Thus the aggregated scale does not bear a prestigeous 
quality at all; it is social order constructed by sociologists, and it has as 
such no merits compared with other variables or indices sociologists compose to 
quantify social status.
This then is what is wrong with traditional research on prestige: There is a 
notorious interchanging of the meaning of the word "prestige". The aggregation
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scale in order to qualify as a scale of prestige must be interpreted in the 
light of the individually assessed prestige judgments because these are the only 
expressions of prestige we have. These individual expressions of prestige, how­
ever, do not lend themselves to ordering a total society in terms of prestige 
since they are expressions of relative and subject-based opinions, evaluations, 
and perceptions. Both notions, that of a structural conrnon prestige variable 
and that of personal and group specific prestige judgments, are incompatible, 
and they should not intermingle at the cost of a category mistake.
In recognition of this incompatibility, the term "prestige" ought to be abandoned 
from prestige research. There is no object to study deserving that name. Instead, 
we should turn to two separated social phenomena being of interest in their own 
right: The status order with regard to a total society, which sociologists are 
free to design in many ways, and the relative order of “life styles" with regard 
to subsections of that total society. (Of course, one may instead speak of the 
B-prestige and the A-prestige, respectively, if one wishes to).
Note that both kinds of prestige sub-terms are ment to be terms of sociological 
relevance. Whereas this should be obvious with regard to the B-series of prestige 
as a general structural social dimension it would be unfortunate to conceive 
the A-series merely as a psychological, if not private phenomenon. The relative 
order of life styles refers to "stimuli" that are common to a specific group 
of societal members. Usually these conrton stimuli will be abstracted roles, 
"places" in institutions, or social positions in general. The A-series of pre­
stige does not refer to our everyday personal evaluations of people we know or 
get acquainted with. Personal respect (esteem) or disdain may guide our private 
actions but these must not be contingent on the styles of life of the persons 
we are loving or scornful with.
It is of interest to note that all theorists of prestige who are seeking expla­
nations for the structural features of a common prestige scale are turning to 
Weber's idea of "social honor" at one point or other. Actually, there is a very 
unfortunate statement by Weber that is being cited continuously and inconside­
rately. It pertains to the fact that it is the distribution of social honor 
within a society that determines the "social order" characteristic for that 
society. Taken at face value, Weber's remark seems to be in line with the socio-
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logical strife for a general dimension of prestige by which society can be
stratified and of which it's members have different amounts at their disposal.
In fact, research on social inequality in the 30's and 4 0 's in the United States,
and after World War II in Germany was to a large extent research on how the
commodity prestige was differentially distributed among society's members. It
was this frame of mind by which the tremendous efforts of assessing overall
prestige scales were induced, 
i
It would however be totally beside the point to claim Weber as king's evidence 
in favour of this enterprise. Rather, Weber's notion of social honor was linked 
closely to the idea of "status groups", i.e., to communities (of an "amorphous 
kind") the members of which share a corcmon set of values, traditions, fashions, 
and, in general, a particular style of life. Thus, social honor is "normally 
expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of live can be ex­
pected from all those who wish to belong to the circle" or specific status group. 
It is true that an order of status groups amounts to establishing social in­
equalities -- by restricting possibilities for social intercourse, by various 
sorts of material monopolies, and by preferential opportunities excluding all 
those who are not recognized as bearers of specific conventions and who are 
alien to the status group in question. These inequalities, however, do not arise 
because individuals are attributed different levels of prestige on a common 
prestige scale, but because of the social mechanisms linked to the closure of 
status groups. In fact, the mere definition of a status group introduced by 
Weber prohibits that members of one such group are capable of developing a firm 
idea of the general prestige distribution spanning the whole society because, 
being members of specific groups they are exposed to the ruling values and con­
ventions that are typical for those groups. Their judgments are bound to be re­
lative. Their judgments of "prestige" are evaluations of other styles of life 
viewed from perspectives of those styles of life they have learned to identify 
with themselves. Put differently, social honor in Weber's sense represents the 
A-series of social prestige, not the structural prestige of the B-series.
This has not kept theorists as well as empirically working students of prestige 
from interpreting general prestige scales in terms of the A-series of prestige. 
Different theories give different accounts of what is basic to such an interpre­
tation. If not "social honor", the property that these theories prefer to rest
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the "meaning" of prestige on has been named "charisma" (ShiIs), or "commitment 
to values that are central" (Eisenstadt), or, as is true for functionalism, 
"rewards for socially important deeds". But all such interpretations, regardless 
of how they are qualified, cannot bear out that they are relying on the notion 
of our everyday experiences of prestige judgments, and these judgments are of 
unadulterated subjectivity and socially contingent. They amount, at best, to a 
relative order of life styles. But what sociologists, engaging in the study of 
prestige, are looking for is an absolute order of prestige. It’s assessment is, 
as we have seen, logically impossible. Therefore the sociologists1 idea of 
prestige deserves to be called a myth.
4. Two alternatives for analyzing judgments of prestige
Turning away from this myth, as we should, we are left with two -- less confu­
sing -- phenomena within the realm of research on "prestige": the A-series and 
the B-series of prestige proper. Assessing these empirically, will result in a 
relative order of life styles for the former and an order of social status for 
the latter series.
Whereas in order to establish the A-series, we must emphazise interindividual 
variation, choosing appropriate methods of scaling and analyses, the B-series 
calls for aggregation scales. Clearly, in measuring the A-series of prestige 
we must rely on self-reports of the subjects the attitudes of which we are in­
terested in; therefore a direct scaling approach like that comnonly applied in 
reputational prestige research is required. Measurement of the structural com­
ponent of prestige (its B-series), on the other hand, may rely on various methods 
depending on the theoretical model the researcher is sympathetic with. If however, 
a direct scaling approach is chosen -- instead of, say, socio-economic index 
construction or a metric of interaction patterns —  it is imperative to demon­
strate that the resulting aggregation scale is a scale that is of relevance to 
the status ordering of society. In other words, since the B-series is, above all, 
simply order we must find a way of giving that order an appropriate theory-based 
interpretation.
For mapping interindividual differences in judgment, i.e., for assessing the A- 
series, magnitude measurement is the direct scaling method to choose. The advan-
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tages of the method, in this respect, have been demonstrated frequently and 
need not be dealt with here. It followes from what has been said, that we have 
the choice of two approaches of analyzing data stemming from magnitude measure­
ment of prestige. The first one is aggregation, and the question being raised 
is whether or not the aggregated scale is a structural status scale. The second 
approach aims at differences of the judgments made, and the question being of 
concern in this respect is whether these differences -- if differences are 
traceable at all —  exhibit patterns particular to specific groups of judges. 
Assuming that there is evidence for a systematic distribution of styles of judg­
ments of prestige, prestige research has gained the chance of discriminating 
members of that society, and groups of such members, not because of differences 
in prestige possession, but because different members in society produce dif­
ferent judgments of prestige when asked to make such judgments.
The A-series of prestige therefore, which of course is basic to this latter aspect, 
does not qualify for constructing a general prestige scale, as has been empha­
sized. The individual and group-specific judgments of prestige, however, of 
which the A-series is made up, may still serve as empirical foundation for a 
social metric. This metric is not a traditional metric of prestige since it does 
not attribute scale values to social positions derived from judgments of pre­
stige with regard to these positions. Rather, it provides an ordering of indi­
vidual characteristics of persons making prestige judgments. It metricizes indi­
viduals according to the way they perceive society. The way we perceive the 
social world is relevant for the actions we are capable of taking in this social 
world. Thus, the scaling of the A-series of prestige may prove to be a powerful 
predictor of social inequality —  more powerful than the illusion of the general 
prestige scale.
With this perspective ahead, let's turn to empirical data.
5. Data sets
The data sets for the demonstration of aggregated as well as individual-diffe­
rence scaling of prestige I am attempting now originate from two national, 
cross-sectional surveys in which roughly 4,000 respondents were asked to give 
their judgments about the prestige of occupations. 50 different occupational
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titles served as stimuli. The criterion for selecting the titles was, among 
others, that the list of titles should cover the full range of the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the Treiman scale that is 
based on this classification as completely as possible. The method of measure­
ment was magnitude scaling, employing numbers and lines. In addition, respondents 
gave prestige judgments by conventional category rating scales (9-point).
The interviews were carried out by professional interviewers at respondents’ 
home, and they had the format of typical survey research work including various 
other topics beside prestige. In fact, great effort was devoted to adapting the 
magnitude scaling tasks to this standard situation of interviewing involving a 
number of preparatory studies serving that purpose. Also, in still other com­
panion studies, efforts were made toward assessing measurement theoretical scale 
properties and individual judgment functions with regard to magnitude scales. 
Means for studying possible effects interviewers have on the scaling results 
were provided, in addition.
The construction of the magnitude prestige scales followed the procedures that 
psychophysicists exercise, i.e., the geometric mean of number and line lengths' 
responses to a stimulus was taken as scale value of that stimulus, for each 
individual separately. I omit the report of technical results with regard to 
scale construction and turn to substantial outcomes, immediately -- to aggrega­
tion scales first.
6. Aggregation scales
The aggregation scale of prestige is simply that scale that results if individual 
scale values for occupations are averaged over the entire population of respon­
dents. From our studies, aggregated magnitude and category prestige scales are 
available. In the terminology introduced here, both represent B-series of pre­
stige. What do they measure?
Based on indices of association with other structural variables commonly applied, 
this question was sought an answer for by comparing category and magnitude pre­
stige scales with three of such corranon variables: 1. the so-called international 
prestige scale by Treiman, 2. a scale of socio-economic indices based on educa­
tion and income, primarily, and 3. a status scale derived from distributional
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assumptions about the frequencies of social positions in a society (Stfrensen, 
1979). The three scales were chosen because they relate to the 283 categories 
the International Standard Classification of Occupations provide or can be con­
structed such as to relate to these categories. Since the 50 occupational titles 
that were scaled form a subset of the 283 ISCO titles, it is rendered possible 
to extent the newly constructed prestige scale beyond the number of titles 
actually scaled if a close fit with one of the three complete scales can be 
established.
The correlation matrix of Tab.l displays how the five scales we are dealing with 
interrelate linearily. The first three scales are "prestige" scales, the mean 
magnitude scale (MAG), the mean category scale (CAT) that is based on the iden­
tical number of roughly 4,000 respondents, and the Treiman scale (TREI). All 
three intercorrelate very highly which should not surprise us. The relations bet­
ween the magnitude scale and the category and the Treiman scale, respectively, 
prove to be non-linear. The fit of these two pairs of scales can be improved if 
the additive power function (see bottom lines of Tab.l) is fitted. This form of 
interscale function is always observable when magnitude scales are interrelated 
with categorical scales. Since the Treiman scale is basically a category scale 
this form of interscale function applies to this scale as well as to the cate­
gory scale of our studies. Therefore, the Treiman scale and the category scale 
intercorrelate highly, of course.
The last two rows of the matrix give the correlations with the status scale that 
is based on 9 national samples that were cummulated, and with Sorensen's SAS 
scores. The latter were calculated on the basis of the frequencies of ISCO cate­
gories with which they appeared in the cummulated file of the 9 mentioned stu­
dies, and they were based on the rank order of the Treiman scale.
As can be seen, the correlation of the magnitude scale with the SAS scale is 
highest. Thus, if Sorensen's status scale is a true scale of social status -- 
and this is not only what S0rensen (1979) beliefs in but he has also given 
evidence for SAS being a better discriminating predictor variable in status 
attainment models than socio-economic index scales -- then it may be concluded 
that magnitude scales of prestige, if aggregated, are status scales having the 
same advantageous features as the SAS scale.
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7. Interindividual difference scales
We are looking at interindividual differences, next. Are there interindividual 
differences, and if so, do they distribute in covariation with any attribute 
of the respondents who made the prestige judgments?
From all what we know about magnitude scales, it is not surprising to find, 
first of all, that indeed the individual scales do vary considerably. Some re­
spondents in judging their list of occupational titles exhibit response ranges 
of 200:1 and more, others are unwilling to extent their range even above 2:1. 
Expressed in terms of coefficients of variation with regard to the mean value 
of the individual magnitude scales this coefficient is 76.5; it is only 33.4 
with regard to the comparable category scales. Thus, magnitude scales do map 
variation to a greater extent.
Whether or not this variation in range is an artificial result due to the method 
used, is a problem that must be studied by determining individual judgment func­
tions. This has been done in one of the supplementary studies which I do not 
want to go into here. It suffices for the present purposes to refer to the re­
sults of that study, in particular, that no systematic relationships between the 
form of the judgment functions and characteristics of respondents -- especially 
status characteristics -- were detected. It seems warranted, therefore, to take 
the magnitude scales at face value and look for differences between individuals 
and groups of individuals with regard to the A-series of prestige the magnitude 
scales are thought to express.
Turn to Fig.l for the presentation of one of the systematic interindividual dif­
ferences that were found. They allude to differences in range of both types of 
scales, magnitude and category scales. The total number of respondents has been 
divided into 15 groups differing in socio-economic status; status being assessed 
by factor analyzing income, education, and subjective class position. As can be 
seen, there is a strong positive relationship between the status groups and the 
range of the magnitude prestige judgments. Respondents with low status exhibit 
strikingly smaller response ranges than respondents with high status. This close 
relationship is not observed with regard to the category scales of the same 
respondents (a correlation of .834 for magnitude range vs. a correlation of .489
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for category ranges). Thus, we have a first indication for a systematic relation 
between characteristics of respondents with the prestige judgments they are 
giving.
There is more evidence pertaining to the same issue in Fig.2. The two panels of 
Fig.2 refer to the magnitude scale values of the ten upper most and the ten lower 
most occupations, respectively. Mean values for these groups of occupations were 
computed for each individual; the rank order of occupations this classification 
was based on was that of the aggregated scale. Plotting these values for each 
of the 15 status groups respondents belong to results in the two graphics of 
Fig.2. Clearly, there is a difference in pattern. Whereas the lower occupational 
titles are given relatively higher scores by respondents of lower status groups 
and lower ones by respondents of the higher status groups, the complementary 
pattern is found for the upper ten occupational titles. There is a turning point 
for the most highest status groups with regard to the higher occupations, and 
likely also one for the lowest status group with regard to the lower occupations. 
But in general, we find a negative correlation of -.812 for the relation between 
respondents' status and their judgment of the lower occupations, and a positive 
correlation of .688 for the relation between respondents' status and their 
judgment of higher occupations.
These findings give evidence of the differences in judgment of prestige of re­
spondents who are situated at different positions in the status hierarchy. They 
definitely call into question any of the theoretically derived claims for consen­
sus with regard to the evaluations of occupations. Especially, the status-reward 
hypothesis of functionalist stratification theory is receiving a blow, if not 
down right falsification, when prestige judgments are quantified by magnitude 
methods, and if the results they produce are analyzed in terms of the A-series 
conception of prestige.
However, the evidence cited thusfar relate only to the streching or shrinking of 
scales; some occupations are given higher values by certain classes of respondents 
than other occupations, and vice versa, but the results reported up to here do 
not attack the consensus thesis if that consensus thesis is weakened to just 
claiming consensus of rank order of occupations. Functionalism, and for that 
matter, other theories of structural prestige could well survive if they decided
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to rest their claims on consensus with regard to the mere rank ordering of social 
positions and their worthyness. Inspections of Figs. 3 a-d prohibit any attempt 
of rescue along this line, however.
In these figures the respondents' status is plotted against the number of rank 
respondents assigned to an occupation within the series individuals had to judge. 
Fig.3a displays the respective plot for "garbage collector“. Obviously, garbage 
collector is an occupation of relatively low prestige. As can be seen from the 
figure, garbage collector is given a rank of approximately 13 by respondents 
being placed in the lower status groups, but a rank of over 17 by higher status 
respondents. Thus, there is no consensus about the rank of the occupation at all; 
what's more, the disagreement among respondents does exhibit a systematic pattern, 
the correlation between respondents' status and rank being almost .8.
For "truck driver" (Fig.3b) the respective correlation is even .92; this occu­
pation is also of relatively low prestige. However, as is demonstrated in Figs.
3c and 3d, the relationship is negative for "judge" and for "high school teacher", 
occupations both of relatively high prestige. For these occupations respondents 
prefer lower ranks if stenming from lower status groups than higher status re­
spondents. For "judge" the correlation between status and rank is -.7, for "high 
school teacher" it is -.73. These examples demonstrate the dissensus between the 
rank ordering of judges of different status groups. In general, the correlations 
of the rank orderings (Tau) decreases to the extent the status groups are sepa­
rated.
These results with regard to the spanning of the prestige perception and the 
systematic nature of differences in rank order may be sumnarized in three state­
ments:
1. Judges of occupational prestige who belong to lower status groups are in­
clined to shorten the range of their judgments in contrast to respondents 
of higher status groups.
2. Respondents of low status groups attribute lower prestige scores to occu­
pations at the upper end of the continuum than respondents of higher 
status groups do.
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3. Respondents of high status groups attribute lower prestige scores to occu­
pations at the lower end of the continuum than respondents do who belong 
to lower status groups.
In effect of course, what these regularities amount to is simply this: People ma­
king prestige judgments tend to arrange these judgments such as to have their own 
position on the scale appear relatively favourable. Low status respondents do 
not score incumbents of higher positions as high as those respondents who them­
selves are members of the upper strata. Conversely, high status respondents score 
incumbents of lower positions lower than respondents being members of the lower 
strata themselves. Both strategies ensure that my own position gains status rela­
tive to the image of the social world that I take for reality.
Based on magnitude measurements, the extent of this self-enhancement may be ex­
pressed in the form of functional relationships. Central to psychophysical theory 
(or magnitude measurement theory) is that magnitude responses to stimuli are re­
lated by power functions to the metric of these stimuli. For instance, magnitude 
responses of loudness distribute as power function of the sound intensities that 
are being judged. In principle, this is also true with regard to the magnitude 
scaling of attitudes. But we are not in command of a stimulus metric in this case. 
However, we may try to substitute a stimulus metric by pretending that we know 
what it is people takeas stimulus continuum when making prestige judgments. Thus, 
we may assume that judges of prestige base their judgments on levels of socio­
economic status, for instance. If the individual magnitude responses to occupa­
tional titles can be fitted to the scale of average socio-economic status charac­
teristic for these occupations successfully, we have some indication that respon­
dents do in fact base their judgments on socio-economic status they associate 
with different occupations.
As it turns out, this is in fact possible. Individual magnitude prestige scales 
do have a power function fit with the average status scale of the occupations 
judged. There is an average correlation of .79 for these fittings. Characteristic 
of power functions are their exponents or, in logarithmic coordinates their slopes. 
In the application being of concern here, these parameters indicate how the re­
sponse scores distribute relative to stimulus values, and within which range they 
vary. Plotting the averaged exponents for each of the 15 status groups of re­
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spondents results in what is shown in the lower panel of Fig.4 (filled in points). 
As we see, there is a strong relationship between the sizes of these exponents 
and respondents' status. High status respondents exhibit a larger exponent than 
low status respondents. Since the magnitude responses are expressed as function 
of averaged status scores of the occupations judged, the increase in exponent 
size reflects an increase of extension of the magnitude scales with increasing 
status of respondents. Therefore, it is possible to order respondents with respect 
to their prestige judgments and their functional relations to objective criteria 
of the stimulus occupations.
The unfilled points of the lower panel of Fig.4 represent exponent values for 
power function fits based on a different criterion. In this case, mean magnitude 
prestige values for the occupations judged were computed and the individual mag­
nitude prestige scales were fitted to these values. Based on these scores, the 
relationship between exponents and respondents' status is even stronger (.822).
8. The social relevance of subjective order
In summarizing, I have been proposing this: The aggregate prestige scale is close­
ly related to a scale of social status that is based on distributional assumptions 
about occupational frequencies. Since the aggregated prestige scale does not de­
serve to be called a prestige scale in the sense of prestige being a structural 
component of the total society, this close relationship with the status scale may 
justify the claim of handling the aggregated scale like a social status scale.
This is a pragmatic line of argument based on the premisis that the SAS scale does 
in fact measure status. The argument does not imply that respondents actually base 
their judgments on status distribution because the aggregated scale is an arti­
ficially constructed scale, not a judgment scale in the A-series' meaning.
The second conclusion to be drawn is this. Being interested in prestige we must 
look at the individuals' judgments of prestige; we must consider the A-, not the 
B-series of prestige. With regard to individual judgments it is highly improbable 
that there is consensus, rather these judgments are perspective ladden and they 
express subjective orderings of the social world. When measuring individual pre­
stige judgments by magnitude methods evidence for the relativity of judgments is 
abundant. Moreover, as has been shown with regard to respondents' socio-economic
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status, individual prestige judgments vary as function of that status. This is not 
only true of the width of the individual prestige scales and the density in which 
occupations are located on these scales, but also of the rank order which the 
occupations are brought in by respondents.
Thus it is possible, to quantify respondents with regard to their mode of making 
prestige judgments. This quantification does not amount to a prestige scale, to 
be sure. Rather it discriminates members of society according to their styles of 
social perception. Definitely, the way people perceive other people is of decisive 
social relevance. It determines what they know of other strata and, especially, 
what they know of the behavior being conformative to these strata. Compared with 
high status members of society, those belonging to lower status groups discrimi­
nate less in their perception of the higher social positions. They have less know­
ledge about positions being higher in status than their own. Therefore, their 
knowledge of how to behave in order to gain access to these positions is deficient 
as well. Thus, instead of scaling prestige, scaling the styles in which people 
scale prestige may, if developed further, prove to be an important social indicator.
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